Arthur Roy Frenchik v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, I.M.L. Freight, Inc., and Truck Insurance Exchange : Brief of Defendants by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970
Arthur Roy Frenchik v. The Industrial Commission
of Utah, I.M.L. Freight, Inc., and Truck Insurance
Exchange : Brief of Defendants
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Charles Welch, Jr. and Phil L. Hansen; Attorneys for
Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Frenchik v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, No. 11366 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3505
IN THE SUPREME COUl.T 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR ROY FRENCHIK, . . .. 
fflMfi,ff,'' ~;, 
vs. ' 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Salt Lake County Bar 
Legal Service.a, Inc. 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Ut.ah 
Attorney for PlaiAtiff 
/-·;,:-i 
. :t~ ' 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE __________________ 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
CO MMISSI 0 N ------------------------------------------------ 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------ 2 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------- 5 
Point I 
The findings and order of the Industrial 
Commission are based upon sufficient evi-
dence and should not be overruled ________________ 5 
Point II 
The Industrial Commission's findings of 
fact are conclusive unless arbitrary or ca-
pr1c1ous _____________________________________ ---- -- -------- --------- 14 
CON CL USI 0 N ------------------------------------------------------ 16 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Burton vs. Industrial Commission, 13 U 2d 353, 
37 4 p 2d 439 ---------------------------------------------------- 15 
Oscar Hatf ord, Plaintiff, vs. the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 14 U 2d 184, 230 P 2d 
44 0 ----------------------------- -- ---- ------------------ ------------- 12 
Jensen vs. United States Fuel Company, 18 U 2d 
414, 424 p 2d 440 ______________________________________ 11, 13 
Kent vs. Industrial Commission, 89 U 381, 57 
p 2d 724 ---------------------------------------------------------- 14 
Norris vs. Industrial Commission, 90 U 256, 61 
p 2d 413 ---------------------------------------------------------- 16 
Vause vs. Industrial Commission of Utah and 
the State Insurance Fund, 17 U 2d 217, 407 
p 2d 1006 -------------------------------------------------------- 15 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 -------- 8 
Section 35-1-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ________ 14 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR ROY FRENCHIK, 
P"laintijj, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 
11366 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff from the 
denial of benefits under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act by the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
Defendants concur in the statement made in 
the brief of the Plaintiff. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendants seek a decision of this Court 
affirming the order of the Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the hearing Plaintiff testified that about 
10 o'clock on the morning of August 1, 1964, while 
employed by I.M.L. Freight, Inc., he was in the 
process of emptying a drain pan of oil when he felt 
a sharp pain in his back. ( R. 35, 39) That the drain 
sump was constructed so it protruded about eight 
inches above the level of the floor. ( R. 35) ( R. 39) 
The drain pan was about the lower third of an oil 
drum which had been cut off. (R. 39) The pan filled 
with oil weighed about 7 5 pounds. ( R. 16) 
The Plaintiff reported to his foreman who sent 
him to Dr. Frederick Hicken. ( R. 35, 36) On August 
4th Dr. Hicken "X-rayed it, or had his radiologist 
X-ray it." (R. 36) Dr. Hicken concluded from the 
X-ray that no fracture had occurred. (R. 36) Dr. 
Hicken determined at the time of the initial exami-
nation that the Plaintiff had sustained a strain. 
(R. 1) 
The Plaintiff did not see a doctor again until 
May 20, 1966, some year and nine months after 
August 1, 1964. (R. 41, 42) During the interim he 
worked for the same employer, and he did about the 
same kind of work that he had done prior to August 
1, 1964. (R. 47-48) 
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Plaintiff saw Dr. Gentile, a chiropractor, on 
May 20, 1966 (R. 49), and Dr. Bardole, another 
chiropractor, in July 1966. (R. 50) Plaintiff also 
went to the Veterans Hospital about February 27, 
1967 (R. 73), where X-rays were taken, the report 
being "no evidence of fracture injury or unusual 
soft tissue." ( R. 7 4) The examining physician wrote 
in the hospital record (R. 77) at the bottom of the 
page: "I don't think this boy is markedly incapaci-
tated and should be able to go back to work." On 
November 10, 1966, Plaintiff returned to the office 
of Drs. Hicken and McAllister. Dr. McAllister saw 
the Plaintiff and sent the Plaintiff to Dr. Q. B. Coray 
for new X-rays. Dr. McAllister examined the X-rays, 
including the old X-ray, and said "they looked okay." 
(R. 51) At that time the Plaintiff asked permis-
sion to see an orthopedist and Dr. Hicken advised 
that he could do so. ( R. 52) Thereafter the Plaintiff 
went to see Dr. Neal C. Capel. Dr. Capel hospitalized 
the Plaintiff at the Cottonwood Hospital on March 
27, 1967. (R. 57) The Plaintiff testified that he has 
not undergone surgery. (R. 57) He further testified 
that Dr. Capel told him that "my fracture was 
healed" so the Plaintiff decided not to go back to 
Dr. Capel. (R. 58) After leaving Dr. Capel, the 
Plaintiff has just rested. (R. 60) 
Plaintiff went to Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, a 
neurologist, on November 29, 1966, who did not find 
any significant abnormalities. (R. 70) 
Liability was denied, and an application for 
hearing was filed. 
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After the hearing before the Industrial Com-
mission held April 27, 1967, the Commission ap-
pointed a special medical panel consisting of Dr. 
Boyd G. Holbrook, Chairman, Dr. Wayne Hebertson, 
and Dr. Robert Mohr. (R. 65) On July 21, 1967, 
Plaintiff wrote the Commission stating that he was 
not pleased with the appointment of the panel, and 
that he refused to see Dr. Mohr, a psychiatrist, for 
a fractured back. (R. 67) Dr. Thomas D. Noonan 
was appointed to replace Dr. Hebertsen on the 
panel. ( R. 68) 
Drs. Holbrook and Noonan met with the Plain-
tiff on December 5, 1967, examined him, and reviewed 
the records and X-rays. ( R. 86) The report of the 
medical panel was received by the Industrial Com-
mission on January 2, 1968. ( R. 86) 
The panel found: 
( 1) This applicant may have sustained a 
strain of his spine 8-1-64. 
(2) This panel is unable to relate his 
present difficulty or his lost time from work 
to this strain of the spine that presumably 
healed prior to this examination. 
( 3) There is no significant pre-existing 
condition. The ring apophysis of Ll is felt to 
be insignificant. ( R. 92) 
Objections to the report were filed by the Plain-
tiff ( R. 94-95) , following which the Commission 
held a further hearing (R. 100-122) at which Dr. 
Holbrook, the panel chairman, testified confirming 
by his testimony the findings of the medical panel. 
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The Medical Panel found no evidence of fracture. 
( R. 11 7) The Industrial Commission thereafter re-
viewed the file and the testimony and issued its order 
denying the Plaintiff's claim. (R. 127) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE BASED UPON 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT 
BE OVERRULED. 
The Plaintiff saw Dr. Hicken on August 1 and 
4, 1964, after which he did not see a doctor again 
until May 20, 1966 (R. 41), some year and a half 
after the accident happened. He did not leave work 
until February 27, 1967. (R. 16) He left work on 
his own, not on doctor's orders. (R. 55) In the mean-
time while working he had been doing essentially 
the same kind of work that he had done prior to 
the time that he was injured. (R. 48) 
Q. Okay. But in general you have been 
doing about the same kind of work for the last, 
since August 1st. 
A. Well, you might call it generally the 
same kind of work. 
Q. In detail, it might vary from day to 
day? 
A. Yes. 
After leaving work Plaintiff saw a chiroprac-
tor, Dr. Gentile, on May 20, 1966. (R. 83) On Febru-
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ary 27, 1967, Plaintiff entered the Veterans Hos-
pital where the radiographic report was "There is no 
evidence of fracture injury or unusual soft tissue," 
( R. 7 4) The examining doctor also wrote, "I don't 
think this boy is markedly incapacitated, and he 
should be able to go back to work." ( R. 77) 
The Plaintiff cancelled his appointment at the 
Veterans Hospital. ( R. 73) 
On November 10, 1966, he returned to Dr. Hick-
en's office where he saw Dr. McAllister (R. 50) 
who looked at the old X-ray and said they looked 
okay. ( R. 51) 
The Plaintiff requested permission from Dr. 
Hicken to see an orthopedist so he reported to Dr. 
Neal Capel who admitted him to the Cottonwood 
Hospital on March 27, 1967 (R. 54), where he re-
mained for three days. ( R. 55) A myelogram was 
performed in the hospital but the Plaintiff has not 
undergone surgery. (R. 55-57) Dr. Capel's letter 
addressed to the Industrial Commission dated De-
cember 23, 1966, contains the following: 
In view of the negative findings on X-ray 
he was released for further continuance of 
conservative care at home. 
FINAL DIAGNOSIS: More in the direc-
tion of a ankylosing spondylitis which is too 
early to diagnose fully on X-ray. For further 
observation. (R. 13) 
Dr. R. H. Keller, Radiologist, reported, "No 
evidence of a herniated disc is noted." (R 14, 18) 
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The Plaintiff was not satisfied with Dr. Capel 
so from the time that he left the hospital he has not 
been back to Dr. Capel or under medical care. The 
Plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q. Now, has Dr. Capel - is he giving 
you some treatment now? 
A No. 
Q. Or doing something for you now? 
A. No. I decided not to return to him. 
Q. You've what? 
A. Decided not to go back to him. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Well, because he told me that my frac-
ture was healed, and I - I have reason to 
believe it isn't healed. I have an X-ray on 
me right now taken two days ago. If you want 
to look at it up to the window, you can clearly 
see it, and clearly see it isn't healed. 
Q. In other words, what you are saying 
is that you do not believe what your doctor's 
told you; is that it? 
A. Yes. (R. 57-58) 
The medical panel had the advantage of the 
findings of Dr. Capel and of Dr. Keller, which are 
part of the record. ( R. 6-15, and 18, 19) 
The Plaintiff also saw Dr. Wayne M. Hebert-
son, a neurologist, who in his letter of August 2, 
1967 (R. 70), addressed to Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook 
advised that he had examined Mr. Frenchik on 
November 29, 1966. He wrote: 
8 
I did not find any significant abnormali-
ties on the patient's general examination. Ex-
aminatio!l of the patient's back and neurologi-
cal funct10ns was normal except for some pain 
in the lower back in association with extention. 
(R. 70) 
The record is clear that although the Plaintiff 
went to several qualified and respected doctors, they 
on final diagnosis did not find anything seriously 
wrong with the Plaintiff. In due course a hearing was 
held following which pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., 1953, the medical aspects of 
this claim were assigned to a medical panel consist-
ing of Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Chairman, Dr. Robert 
Mohr, Psychiatrist, and Dr. Wayne Hebertson, 
Neurologist; later as Dr. Hebertson had examined 
the Plaintiff, Dr. Thomas Noonan was appointed 
in his place. 
The above mentioned section of our code pro-
vides in part as follows : 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensa-
tion for injury by accident or for death, aris-
ing out of or in the course of employment, and 
where the employer or insurance carrier 
denied liability, the commission shall refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the Commission ... T~e 
medical panel shall make such study ... as it 
may determine and the~e~fter make 3: report 
in writing to the Commiss10n ... If obJections 
to such report are filed it shall be the .duty of 
the Commission to set the case for hearing, and 
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at such hearing any party so desiring may 
request the Commission to have the medical 
panel or any of its members present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examina-
tion. Upon such hearing the written report of 
the panel may be considered as an exhibit but 
shall not be considered as evidence in the case 
except insofar as it is sustained by the testi-
mony admitted. 
The medical panel report was made by the act-
ing panel members after a complete examination of 
the file of the Industrial Commission, including the 
testimony of the applicant and a physical examina-
tion of him by panel members. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff, in his brief (P.B. 7) 
refers to the letter of the Industrial Commission 
appointing the special panel ( R. 65) which is in 
part as follows: 
The hearing examiner specifically inter-
ested in the fallowing: 
1. The results of a complete examina-
tion of Dr. Mohr, in his specialty, and what 
bearing or effect, if any, in terms of medic~! 
probability, his findings have upon the Apph-
cant's present condition. 
It is contended by the Attorney for the Plaint-
iff that because Dr. Holbrook testified that he did 
not consult with Dr. Mohr that there was not a 
complete examination in accordance with the direc-
tion of the Industrial Commission. (P.B. 7) 
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Attention of the Court is called to the letter of 
Mr. Frenchik, addressed to the Industrial Commis-
sion, in which Mr. Frenchik wrote: 
I am not at all pleased with the appointed 
medical panel to investigate my case. ( 3) Dr. 
Robert Mohr i,s a psychiatmt and I am cer-
tainly not going to see a psychiatrist for a 
fractured back. (R. 67) (emphasis ours) 
Under the circumstances the panel could not 
have had Dr. Mohr join in the report as the Plaintiff 
had refused to see him. It is difficult to see how 
the Plaintiff can now object to the absence of Dr. 
Mohr on the panel, or for the failure of Dr. Mohr to 
make an examination of the Plaintiff when the 
Plaintiff objected to the inclusion of the doctor on 
the panel and stated emphatically that he was "not 
going to see a psychiatrist for a fractured back." 
There is no evidence in the record that the Plaintiff 
ever saw Dr. Mohr. 
Plaintiff in his brief ( P. B. 8) complains that 
the panel did not examine the X-rays alleged to have 
been taken by Dr. Hicken on August 1, 1964. In re-
spect to this point Dr. Holbrook testified that as far 
as he knew no X-rays were taken at that time. (P. B. 
8) In response to questions by Plaintiff (R. 114-115) 
Dr. Holbrook said: 
A. I don't believe that Dr. Hicken took 
any X-rays. Because Dr. Hicken doesn't have 
an X-ray machine, as far as I know. 
Q. Have you ever been in his office? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And you never seen the X-rays? 
A. No. 
The medical panel pursuant to the direction of 
the Commission examined the entire record of the 
Commission and the medical reports contained there-
in. (R. 104) Dr. Hicken's report is part of the record. 
(R. 1) Dr. Holbrook testified that Dr. Hicken's re-
port was examined. (R. 108) It makes no mention 
of X-rays having been taken at that time. 
This Court has said that it considered the medi-
cal panel a useful means to resolve complex medical 
questions. In Jensen vs. United States Fuel Com-
pany, 18 U 2d 414, 424 P 2d 440, this Court said: 
We recognize the value and usefulness of 
an impartial medical panel to make an inde-
pendent examination and diagnosis in such 
cases. We are also in accord with the position 
of the Plaintiff that it is not the panel's prerog-
ative to encroach upon the authority vested 
in the Commission to make the findings of 
fact and render the decision upon the applica-
tion. Its proper purpose is limited to medical 
examination and diagnosis, the evidence of 
which is to be considered by the Commission 
in arriving at its decision. There is no indica-
tion here that this limitation was transgressed. 
In referring the case to the medical panel, t~e 
Commission stated that they should make their 
report upon the assumption that an accident 
had taken place and determine what part, if 
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any, it had played in causing the Plaintiff's 
condition. 
One other Utah case in which the medical panel 
is mentioned is that of Oscar Hackford, Plaintiff, vs. 
the Industrial Commission of Utah, 14 U 2d 184, 
380 P 2d 927. In that case objection was made to the 
panel report. At the hearing the panel chairman testi-
fied on behalf of the panel. The decision of the In-
dustrial Commission was affirmed. The findings 
of the Industrial Commission were apparently based 
upon the report of the medical panel and the testi-
mony of the chairman of the panel which the Court 
felt was substantial enough evidence to permit it 
to sustain and affirm the decision of the Commis-
sion. 
In the case before the Court the Industrial Com-
mission properly instructed the medical panel as to 
its function and further advised the panel that it 
should make its report upon the assumption that an 
accident had taken place and determine what part 
the accident played in causing the Plaintiff's condi-
'tion. ( R. 65) This the panel proceeded to do and 
made a finding adverse to the Plaintiff only after it 
had the opportunity to examine the record, the medi-
cal reports and the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Frenchik may have strained his back on 
August 1, 1964; however the numerous medical ex-
aminations which he has undergone have failed to 
result in any findings that his troubles stem from 
the August 1, 1964, incident. Furthermore, the 
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Plaintiff continued working for 18 months after 
August 1, 1964, during which time he did not seek 
medical attention. The Industrial Commission was 
not arbitrary or capricious in considering the evi-
d.ence and lack of evidence in reaching its conclu-
s10n. 
In connection with the claim that the opinion 
of the Medical Panel might have been different had 
X-rays claimed to have been taken by Dr. Hicken, 
the referee at the second hearing inquired of Dr. 
Holbrook as follows: ( R. 118) 
Q. Doctor, in light of the appplicant's 
medical history, which the panel considered, 
do you feel that there would in all probabil-
ity, be anything in the X-rays of August 4, 
'64, taken by Dr. Hicken, that would not have 
appeared subsequently, or which would have 
changed? 
A. I would think that it is unlikely that 
there would be. 
In Jensen vs. United States Fuel, supra, the 
Plaintiff, as has the Plaintiff in the case before the 
Court, presented evidence to show that he had a bad 
back which was painful and distressed him; that he 
had suffered a back injury while employed. However, 
the Court in the Jens en case said at U. 417: 
We see no reason to disagree with Plain-
tiff's contention that his evidence shows with-
out dispute that he had a bad back which w~s 
painful and distressing to him,. In fact t~1s 
seems to have been so for some time even pr10r 
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to the accident. Furthermore, there is substan-
tial, competent and believable evidence that he 
suffered a bruise to his back by bumping it on 
the bolting machine in Defendant's mine in 
July, 1964. However, this is not true of the 
critical issue in this case: whether that inci-
dent had any causal relationship to the condi-
tion of the intervertebral disc and bony struc-
ture of his back which required the operations. 
While both parties argue that the evidence on 
this disputed issue is conclusive in their favor, 
there is a basis in the evidence from which the 
Commission could reasonably refuse to find 
that the accident was what caused Plaintiff's 
d'isability. Therefore we cannot conclude that 
the denial of an award was capricious or arbi-
trary. (emphasis ours) 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FIND-
INGS OF FACT ARE CONCLUSIVE UNLESS 
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
It has been said by the Supreme Court in numer-
ous decisions that pursuant to Section 35-1-84, 
U.C.A., 1953, that only if the Industrial Commission 
arbitrarily disregards competent, uncontradicted 
evidence will the decision of the Commission be re-
versed. Further that the Commission's order should 
be affirmed unless the Court finds that the Com-
mission acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unreason-
ably in the denial of compensation. 
In Kent vs. Industrial Commission, 89 U 381, 57 
P 2d 724 at 385 U. the Court said: 
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In the case of denial of compensation, 
the record must disclose that there is material 
substantial, competent, uncontradicted evi~ 
dence sufficient to make a disregard of it justi-
fy the conclusion as a matter of law, that the 
I~dustria} Commission arbitrarily and capri-
c10usly disregarded the evidence or unreason-
ably refused to believe such evidence. 
In Burton vs. Industrial Commission, 13 U 2d 
353, 37 4 P 2d 439, this Court said at 354 U: 
In order to reverse the finding and order 
made, the Plaintiff must show that there is 
such creditable, uncontradicted evidence in her 
favor that the Commission's refusal to so find 
was capricious and arbitrary. 
See also the recent case of Vause vs. Industrial 
Commission of Utah and the State Insurance Fund, 
17 U 2d 217, 407 P 2d 1006. This was a proceeding to 
review the decision of the Industrial Commission 
denying compensation for disability alleged to have 
been the result of an occupational disease arising 
from exposure to dust and fumes. 'The Order of 
Denial was affirmed, and this Court said at page 
220 Utah: 
It is thus apparent that there is ample 
basis in the evidence upon which the Commis-
sion could reasonably refuse to believe that the 
Plaintiff contracted an occupational disease 
arising out of his employment. This Court can-
not properly reverse the Commission and com-
pel an award unless there is creditable evi-
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dence without substantial contradiction which 
points so clearly and persuasively in Plain-
tiff's favor that failure to so find would justi-
fy the conclusion that the Commission acted 
capriciously, arbitrarily, or unreasonably in 
disregarding or refusing to believe the evi-
dence. No such situation is shown to exist here. 
(emphasis ours) 
This question has been ruled upon many times 
by this Court. In the case of Norris vs. Industrial 
Commission, 90 U 256, 61 P 2d 413, this Court re-
stated the well-supported rule that it is for the Com-
mission to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to 
be the final arbitrator of the facts. 
This Court took the same position in Baker vs. 
Industrial Commission, 17 U 2d 141, 405 P 2d 613. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the Industrial Commission's 
Order is founded upon substantial evidence, that it 
did not act in a capricious or arbitrary manner, and 
that its Order should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Defendants 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
